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I. Introduction
The United States traditionally has proclaimed itself a generous
and compassionate nation in terms of refugee protection.1 As Ronald
Reagan stated upon accepting the Republican nomination for presi-
dency: "Can we doubt that only a divine Providence placed this land,
this land of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world
who yearn to breathe free? Jews and Christians enduring persecution
behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people of Southeast Asia, Cuba, and
Haiti."2
Despite these optimistic words, it is widely understood that our
nation's resources are limited. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict im-
migration to the United States to admit only the number of individuals
who can be assimilated successfully. With an estimated eighteen mil-
lion refugees in the world, a dramatic increase from only 1.4 million in
1960, refugee issues have emerged in the forefront of national politics
and media news.3 In response to the current influx of refugees onto
American soil, many Americans have asserted that the United States
has reached the limit of its capacity to accommodate and assimilate
immigrants. 4 Further, it is argued that immigration poses a substantial
threat to American economic and social welfare. 5 Yet human rights
supporters persistently have maintained that as a democratic world
leader, the United States has a duty to provide refuge for those fleeing
persecution due to their religious or political convictions. As a nation
founded by immigrants, the United States is bound to its promise to
provide protection indiscriminately for the "huddled masses yearning
to breathe free," as expressed by poet Emma Lazurus' words inscribed
on the Statue of Liberty.6 The intense debate surrounding refugee
policy in the United States has led scholars to label it accurately the
"civil rights movement of our time." 7
Historically, Congress has been assigned the difficult task of re-
1 See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERI-
CAN'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT Xiii (1986). In 1783, George Washington de-
scribed America as a "land whose 'bosom is open to receive the persecuted and oppressed of
all nations."' Id; see also NORMAN L. ZUCER & NAOMI FLINK ZUCKER, THE GUARDED GATE: THE
REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY ix (1987).
2 Text of Reagan"s Speech Accepting the Republican Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1980, at
A8.
3 See THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGEES 3 (1993). The United Nations reported 18.2 million refugees worldwide
as of December 31, 1992, not including internally displaced people in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. Id. A primary cause of this steep increase in displacement is the decolonization that
occurred during the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 14.
4 For example, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) is a leading
nonprofit organization promoting further restrictions on immigration. For a discussion of
FAIR and its activities, see Patrick J. McConnell & Paul Jacobs, FAIR at Forefront to Reduce
Immigration, LA. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at Al.
5 Id.
6 EMMA LAZURUS, The New Colossus, in POEMS OF EMMA LAZURUS I, 202 (1888).
7 See Lung-Chu Chen, The Judge Edward D. Re Distinguished Lecture Series Symposium on
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sponding to humanitarian appeals for aid and attempting to ensure
the fair treatment of all immigrants. 8 A necessary element of these
decisions has included limiting refugee admissions which, left unbri-
dled, would pose serious threats to national security. The U.S. govern-
ment has met these challenges with varying degrees of success.9 The
1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act were the
first attempt by Congress to legislatively establish a channel for the ad-
mission of refugees.10 To overcome technical barriers to refugee ad-
missions contained in the 1965 Amendments, the executive branch
developed the use of the Attorney General's "parole authority" to ad-
mit large numbers of refugees. 1
The increasing recognition of the political bias underlying refu-
gee admissions policy and the increasing tension caused by the exten-
sive use of parole authority led to the adoption of the first
comprehensive body of refugee legislation in 1980.12 Through for-
mally adopting the United Nation's Protocol,13 the Refugee Act of
1980 endeavored to set a uniform and just standard for the admission
of refugees. 14
The Refugee Act was originally conceived to grant asylum on the
basis of humanitarian principles, balancing the individual merits of
each case and executive discretion. t5 An examination of the refugee
admissions policies of the United States during the 1980s, however,
does not indicate a dramatic change in American policy towards refu-
gees. 16 During the 1980s, a Reagan administration task force took af-
firmative steps to regain control of American borders through
enforcing stiff sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants and
through the detention of illegal aliens. 17 Even more controversial,
however, is the Haitian interdiction program which continues to en-
able the forced return of thousands of Haitians seeking asylum in the
Human Rights Before Domestic Courts: The United States Supreme Court and the Protection of Refugees,
67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 469 (1993).
8 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part III.
10 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (1965), repeated in part by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1159 (1980) [hereinafter the 1965
Amendments].
11 See infra notes 126-53 and accompanying text.
12 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat 102 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (1988) [hereinafter Refugee Act].
13 See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 21, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N T.S. 150 (1951) [hereinafter the 1951 Convention].
14 Id.
15 See infra notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
17 See LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE
ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 3 (1990). While these actions were calculated to deter
illegal immigration for the purpose of employment, thousands of those aliens have been
locked in inhumane detention facilities including a significant number who have colorable
asylum claims. Id
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United States.18
Over the past several decades, Congress and the President have
responded frequently to international refugee crises. 19 However, his-
tory clearly shows that the appeals that have been heeded the most
frequently are those which advance American political objectives.20 To
a great extent, the decision of what constitutes a "well-founded fear" of
persecution continues to be decided on the basis of the prevailing U.S.
political agenda.21
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the historical ori-
gins of current U.S. refugee law, focusing on America's pragmatic re-*
sponse to the refugee crisis in Europe following the Soviet Revolution
of 1917. Significant developments in emergency refugee legislation
from 1948 to 1957 are discussed in Part III. Part IV analyzes the emer-
gence of the parole authority of the Attorney General as a major vehi-
cle for the mass admission of refugees. The unfettered use of parole
authority by the Executive branch allowed U.S. foreign policy to domi-
nate refugee admissions during the Cold War, as discussed in Part V.
Part VI examines events leading up to the adoption of comprehensive
refugee legislation in 1980 and analyzes the Refugee Act of 1980's suc-
cess in establishing a uniform system of admissions. Finally, Part VII
makes recommendations for change.
II. The Origins of Refugee Law: 1790-1940
A. Federal Control of Immigration
Federal legislation regulating the influx of immigrants to the
United States can be traced to the late 18th century. Initially, the
scope of the federal government's power with respect to immigration
was narrowly prescribed. 22 Until the Act of 1875, the primary function
underlying federal regulations was achieving uniformity among the
various states and coordinating their respective immigration
procedures.23
In general, immigration to the United States in the 18th century
was relatively unrestricted.2 4 The lack of public opposition to the flow
of newcomers is explained by the prevailing belief that the immigrants
18 See infra notes 336-47 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 89-246 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 89-246 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 91-252 and accompanying text.
22 See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-
1965, 11-45 (1981)(detailing the emergence of federal control over immigration matters).
23 See id. at 11. For example, in 1790, a national rule was passed which required resi-
dence for two years before naturalization and prevented particular states with more lenient
naturalization requirements from forcing unwanted immigrants upon other states. Id.
24 Lawrence H. Fuchs, Immigration, Pluralism and Public Policy: The Challenge of the
Pluribus to the Unum, in U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 294 (Mary M. Kritz eds., 1982)
(analyzing the changing social perception of immigrants throughout U.S. history and the
need for a new theory of civic unity which incorporates cultural pluralism).
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would be absorbed readily by the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. 25
The vast majority of the immigrants spoke English, were of Protestant
descent, and originated from Northern Europe. 26 Their similarities to
the existing American population made their cultural assimilation
more realistic, thereby subduing hostility to their arrival.2 7
However, restrictionist sentiment was apparent as early as 1753
when President Franklin complained, "this in a few years will become a
German colony: instead of their learning our language we must learn
theirs, or live as in a foreign country."28 President Franklin's warnings
foreshadowed the dramatic change in public opinion and the growing
political debate surrounding immigration issues that would emerge
during the 19th century. In the early 1800s, the composition of immi-
grants arriving into the United States dramatically shifted. An increas-
ing percentage of immigrants were from Catholic countries in
southern and eastern Europe. 29 In 1840, one-third of all immigrants
were of Catholic descent.30 That number had increased to one-half by
1850.31
As immigration became more controversial, the federal govern-
ment's role in controlling it increased. In Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, the Supreme Court declared that authority over immigration
matters is a fundamental prerogative of the federal government. 32
The Court reasoned that "U]urisdiction over its own territory ... is an
incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its indepen-
dence."33 If the U.S. government could not exercise this authority, "it
would be to that extent subject to the control of another power."34
With the exception of a brief period of expansion during the Civil
War due to a demand for labor, the federal government asserted its
control over the states by enacting a series of laws that restricted immi-
gration. 3 5 These laws were a departure from former regulation of im-
migration law by the states which sought only to regulate and control
admissions. 3 6 Instead, the new federal laws asserted the responsibility
of the federal government for immigration matters and sought to ex-
clude entirely specific classes of individuals.3 7
25 Id.
26 Id. at 295.
27 Id. at 294-96.
28 Id. at 294-95.
29 ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 3.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 581 (1889).
33 Id. at 603.
34 Id.
35 See HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 85-158 (discussing the development of legislation
providing for the comprehensive regulation of immigration in the United States from 1883-
1913).
36 Id. at 84.
37 Id.
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The Immigration Act of 1875 marked the beginning of direct fed-
eral restriction of immigration.38 The Act endeavored to eliminate the
problems associated with Chinese immigration. 39 It strictly prohibited
the entry of any Asian nationals without their consent and excluded
those convicted in their own country of felonious crimes. 40 In 1882,
Congress imposed further limitations on immigration through its
adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act. 41 The Chinese Exclusion Act
went further than any previous limitation by suspending the eligibility
for immigration of individuals of Chinese descent for ten years. 42
In the years following the Chinese Exclusion Act, federal restric-
tions on refugee admissions became increasingly comprehensive. 43
Generally, the U.S. government imposed three types of limitations on
immigration: (1) the exclusion of specific groups of immigrants, 44 (2)
barriers to immigration, such as literacy tests45 or tests of economic
self-sufficiency, 46 and (3) the regulation of immigration through na-
tional origins quotas.47
By adopting the Immigration Act of 1917, Congress endeavored to
codify existing immigration law.48 The Act also responded to the con-
cern that American standards were being lowered by the influx of un-
educated immigrants by incorporating a literacy requirement. 49 In
addition, the Immigration Act of 1917 established the "Asiatic barred
zone," a provision which made Asians completely ineligible for immi-
gration to the United States.50
During the 1930s, in response to the flood of Central American
immigrants, the State Department ordered strict enforcement of a pro-
vision of the Immigration Act of 1917 that restricted the admission of
"persons likely to become a public charge."51 The "public charge"
38 Id. at 66.
39 Id. at 65.
40 Id. at 65-66 (citing The Immigration Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875)). An
exception was granted for "political offenses." Id.
41 The Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). The Act was repealed as a
gesture of good will after World War II in 1943; however, it was replaced by a quota which
limited Chinese immigration to only 105 persons annually. SeeAct of December 17, 1943, ch.
344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943).
42 The Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882). The Act provided an
exception for those who resided in the United States on November 17, 1880. Id.
43 See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
44 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
45 See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
48 Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (hereinafter Immigration Act of
1917). The 1917 Act excluded "[a]ll aliens over sixteen years of age, physically capable of
reading, who can not read the English language." Id.
49 Id. at 877.
50 Id. at 875-76. The Immigration Act of 1917 provides that "natives of any country,
province, or dependency situation on the Continent of Asia" are excluded from the United
States. Id. at 875.
51 ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 16.
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clause denied admission to immigrants who appeared to lack the fi-
nancial means to support themselves while living in the United
States.52 Laborers from Central America (and elsewhere) were re-
stricted further by a contract-labor provision of the Immigration Act of
1917 that prohibited foreign nationals from entering into contracts for
labor with American citizens or companies. 53 Therefore, even if an
immigrant could show that he was able to support himself economi-
cally by employment in the United States, he would be denied admis-
sion due to a violation of the contract-labor provision.54 The
combination of these two provisions effectively denied admission to all
immigrants except the rare few who were wealthy or had an individual
willing to provide support in the United States. 55
Four years after the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1917,
the Quota Act was adopted as a temporary limitation on immigration
in an attempt to restrict immigration from certain areas. 56 Thereafter,
quotas became a mechanical basis of restriction designed to propor-
tionately reflect American national origins. 57 The Quota Act set forth
percentages of immigrants eligible for admission from both northern
and southeastern Europe based on percentages derived from the U.S.
Census Bureau.58 However, immigration from the western European
countries remained unrestricted. 59 In 1924, Congress made the tem-
porary quota system permanent by adopting the National Origins
Act.60 The National Origins Act became a significant element of U.S.
immigration policy and continued to pose technical barriers to the ad-
mission of refugees until 1965.61 Because it based admissions on na-
tionality, the quota system originally established by the Quota Act has
been widely criticized for elevating the issues of race, ethnic prejudice
and assimilation above any concerns for human suffering or the des-
perate situation of particular refugees.
52 See Immigration Act of 1917, supra note 48, at 876.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 17.
56 Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
57 Id. at 5-6.
58 The Quota Act provides in pertinent part:
[TIhe number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the
immigration laws of the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per
centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in
the United States as determined by the Census of 1910.
Id. at 6.
59 See id.
60 The National Origins Act, ch. 190, 43. Stat. 153 (1924). The National Origins Act was
extended with the enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (1952) (as codified in Title 8, U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1952)). The national origins quota
system was repealed by the 1965 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
61 See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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B. The Refugee Crisis in Europe
While the U.S. government was enacting laws to tighten its bor-
ders, European countries were attempting to accommodate the one
and one-half million victims displaced by the 1917 Soviet Revolution. 6 2
In addition, in 1924, a new group of refugees was created in Turkey as
Armenians were being persecuted by the Turkish government. 63 Years
later, the government of Iraq began the brutal persecution of the mi-
nority Assyrian population. 64 The refugee population also expanded
to include Jews with the onset of Nazi persecution in Germany.6 5 De-
spite widespread violence and the masses of displaced persons, Euro-
pean governments did not consolidate efforts to ensure the safety and
welfare of the European refugee population. 66 Legally, the refugees
who scattered across Europe were not distinguished from other illegal
immigrants. 6 7 Thus, they too were subject to deportation and many
were imprisoned for violating border laws.68
In 1949, in response to the European refugee crisis, the General
Assembly of the United Nations established the office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).6 9 After its forma-
tion, the UNHCR promulgated the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, which limited refugee status to those persons dis-
placed during World War 11.70 The UNHCR expanded the definition
of refugee, in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to
include those suffering from persecution unrelated to the war.7 1 '
C. The U.S. Response
In the wake of World War II in 1945, a U.S. State Department
report described the situation in Europe as "one of the greatest popu-
lation movements of history .... 20 to 30 million of the people of
Europe already [have been] torn from their moorings by the terrific
impact of war." 72 The immigration laws of the United States at that
62 ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 13-14.
63 Id. at 15.
64 Id. at 16.
65 Id. at 17.
66 While there was no single consolidated effort, many countries did provide temporary
legal residence. Id. at 14. Further assistance was given by a minority of host governments
through the issuance of work permits. Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
70 See 1951 Convention, supra note 13.
71 The Protocol was signed on January 31, 1967. United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967) [hereinafter
the Protocol].
72 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 1. Those uprooted who were able to move to
Allied zones of military occupation were living in desperate situations in areas where housing
and basic infrastructure had been destroyed. Id.
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time did not recognize refugee status for persons seeking admission
due to political persecution. 73 The Immigration Act of 1917 provided
only two exceptions: those fleeing from religious persecution; 74 and
immediate family members of admissible foreign nationals. 75 Since
the 1930s, the United States had considered admitting refugees as a
special class of immigrants. 7 6 However, the U.S. government was still
unwilling to consider the option of permanent resettlement in the
United States. The American response to the developing situation in
Europe remained pragmatic. 77
The restrictionist posture of the United States following World
War II was altered largely through the efforts of leaders of the Jewish-
American community. 78 Jewish- Americans recognized that, while re-
patriation was unrealistic for most displaced persons after World War
II, it was impossible for those who had suffered Nazi persecution. In-
stead, they required a resettlement program that would permit them to
reestablish their lives permanently. 79 As a result of a combination of
reports concerning the hardships suffered by displaced persons in Eu-
rope and pressure from the Jewish-American community, President
Truman set up consular offices in American zones and ordered that
visas for those displaced during World War II be allotted out of ex-
isting but unused annual quotas.80
However, restrictionist attitudes in Congress prevailed and re-
vealed the emerging discriminatory patterns of U.S. refugee policy. 81
Congress was fearful of the social and economic impact that a more
generous treatment of Jewish refugees would have on the United
States.82 Several Congressmen were overtly anti-semitic. 83 Despite the
pleas of several Congressmen concerning Jewish refugees, particularly
concerning the plight ofJewish children in war-torn Europe, Congress
even rejected proposals to grant visas to Jewish refugee children.8 4
73 See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 6.
74 See 1917 Act supra note 48, at 877.
75 Id. at 891.
76 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 210.
77 Id. at 3. The U.S. government primarily responded with emergency relief consisting
of food and clothing. Id.
78 See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, AMERICA AND THE SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST 34 (1982)
(arguing that "Jews in the United States felt themselves morally bound to lead and finance
the work of the rehabilitation and resettlement of the Holocaust survivors").
79 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 4-7.
80 Directive by the President, December 22, 1945, reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Decem-
ber 23, 1945, at 13.
81 For a general analysis of the U.S. policy concerningJewish Refugees following World
War II see D. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS, (1984) (describing the U.S. govern-
ment's response to the Jewish refugee population in the aftermath of World War II).
82 See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 78, at 137-38.
83 Id. One Democratic senator stated, "I am ashamed to say that frequently it is said in
the Halls of Congress: They are nothing but Communists, nothing but Jews - hated, de-
spised, unwanted spawn from the Old World." Id. at 138 (citing minutes of the CCDP Execu-
tive Committee Meeting).
84 House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, Admission of German Refugee Children,
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Efforts to aid holocaust survivors were hindered further with the
emergence of the Cold War. Congress adopted the view that refugees
could play an invaluable role in resisting Communism.8 5 U.S. refugee
policy was seen by members of Congress as a form of psychological
warfare in the developing conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Instead of enacting refugee legislation designed to pro-
vide protection for those most in need of it, immigration policy came
to be used as a tool to advance the interests of democracy.8 6 The U.S.
government believed that by encouraging migration out of Soviet
countries, the United States could undermine Soviet leaders. Asylum
came to be offered as an incentive for defection.8 7
III. The Development of U.S. Refugee Legislation: 1948-1957
A. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
The first major legislative enactment with respect to the admission
of refugees was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.88 The Displaced
Persons Act was enacted specifically as temporary emergency legisla-
tion in response to the refugee crisis in Europe following World War
11.89 The Act has been the subject of great criticism.90 Instead of pro-
tecting the victims of Nazi persecution, it singled out those fleeing
from communist or communist-dominated nations as the most deserv-
ing of refugee status.9 1
Although there were attempts to minimize technical barriers, the
practical limitations imposed by the exclusionary provisions of the
quota system continued to apply to those seeking refuge in the United
States after World War 11.92 Generally, the nationalities requiring the
most relief were those which had been given low admission numbers
1939: Hearings onJJ. Res. 165 and H.. Res. 168, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). Of the several
bills proposed to aid Jewish refugees between 1933 and 1938, only the Wagners-Rogers bill
received serious consideration. See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 19-20. The bill pro-
vided for the admission of only 20,000 German refugee children over a two year period. Id.
at 20. Most Americans believed that the bill was a modest attempt to rescue Jewish children.
Id. at 21. Only one year later, Congress approved a bill which allowed the entrance of British
children. Id.
85 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 24.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 23-24.
88 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) [hereinafter Displaced Persons
Act].
89 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 19-24.
90 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that because the Displaced Persons
Act was fraught with restrictions designed to favor groups other than surviving Jews it pro-
duced a storm of public protest).
91 Id.
92 The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 allowed no new admissions, but did permit "quota
mortgaging." In other words, it provided for borrowing against immigration quotas allotted
for future years. See Displaced Persons Act, supra note 88, at 1010. The Displaced Persons
Act did, however, grant special relief to orphan children. Id.
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according to national origin.93 Although a large percentage of the ex-
isting quotas could not be filled, the U.S. government remained unwill-
ing to create a specific preference for refugee admission. 94
A significant limitation on the admission of Jewish displaced per-
sons was imposed through the incorporation of cut-off dates.95 The
Displaced Persons Act required that those who applied for visas show
that they entered Allied zones on or before December 22, 1945.96 This
arbitrary cut-off date had the effect of denying the benefit of the Act to
the great number of Jews who had fled the Soviet Union or Poland
after this date.97 This provision also had the effect of excluding all
recent refugees from the benefit of the Act.98 As a result of the inclu-
sion of cut-off dates, visas were denied to ninety percent of the dis-
placed Jews. 99
The remaining eligible ten percent were also besieged by restric-
tions. Two other provisions in the Displaced Persons Act had the ef-
fect of significantly reducing the number ofJews eligible for admission.
The first required that forty percent of all refugees originate from na-
tions "de facto annexed by a foreign power."100 Because the majority
of Holocaust survivors departed from Germany, a nation not "under
foreign domination," almost half of the total slots for resettlement in
the United States were not available to Jewish displaced persons. 101
The second limiting provision was included in response to a
shortage of American agricultural workers. Thirty percent of the refu-
gees admitted were required to have agricultural skills. 102 Those who
had acquired other skills in demand in the United States were assigned
a subordinate preference.103 Since displaced persons from the Baltic
regions generally were known as skilled agricultural workers, this provi-
sion gave a marked advantage to refugees coming from Soviet-domi-
93 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 6-7.
94 Id.
95 According to section 2 of the Displaced Persons Act, a displaced person is one "who
on or after September 1, 1939, and on or before December 22, 1945, entered Germany,
Austria, or Italy and who on January 1, 1948, was in Italy or the American sector." Displaced
Persons Act, supra note 88, at 1009.
96 Id.
97 See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 9, 13 (1981) [hereinafter Forty Year Crisis].
98 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 20.
99 Signing of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Statement by the President, June 25,
1948, DEP'T ST. BULL. 19, 21-22 (July, 1948) [hereinafter Signing of the DP Act].
100 Section 3(b) of the Act states, "During the two fiscal years following the passage of
this Act ... not less than 40 per centum of the visas issued pursuant to this Act shall be
available exclusively to eligible displaced persons whose place of origin or country of nation-
ality has been de facto annexed by a foreign power." Displaced Persons Act, supra note 88, at
1010.
101 See Signing of the DP act, supra note 99, at 22.
102 Section 6 of the Displaced Persons Act limits eligibility to "eligible displaced persons
who have previously engaged in agricultural pursuits and who will be employed in the United
States in agricultural pursuits." Id. at 1012.
103 Id.
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Despite a storm of public outcry, the Displaced Persons Act was
signed reluctantly into law in 1948 by President Truman. 10 5 Upon
signing the Act, President Truman stated that "[i]n its present form
this bill is flagrantly discriminatory. It mocks the American tradition of
fair play." 106 Popular criticism caused the Act to be amended in 1950
and 1951. Both of these amendments had the effect of loosening the
severe restrictions imposed by the original Act. 10 7
B. The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952
The discriminatory and self-serving immigration policies of the
1940s continued in the 1950s, although the concern for "fairness" was
more frequently expressed in the Congressional debates.' 0 8 In 1951, a
principal subject of legislative action was the revision of the Quota
Act. 109 The McCarran Bill offered to curb the element of racial dis-
crimination in the immigration process while also encouraging the ad-
mission of persons with needed skills. °10 Several Congressmen
opposed the bill on the grounds that it created new elements of racial
discrimination and failed to adequately allow for the admission of refu-
gees." a1  Despite the growing concern for an additional preference for
refugees, the McCarran-Walter Act overcame a presidential veto and
became law in 1952.112
The Act's adoption severely confined the expansion of refugee
protection in the United States. Through establishing the quota sys-
tem initiated by the Quota Act of 1921, the new Act once again posed
serious technical obstacles to refugee admission. Recognizing these
limitations, President Truman pressured for emergency legislation in
104 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 20.
105 Id. at 21.
106 See Signing of the DP Act, supra note 99, at 21.
107 There were two major changes that extended the protection of the Displaced Per-
sons Act. An Act to Amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219 (1950). One amendment consisted of extending the act to those fleeing China. Id. at
222. Another revised the cut-off dates for arrival into Allied zones to allow a person displaced
since January 1, 1945 to be eligible for resettlement in the United States. Id. at 219.
108 See LoESCHFaR & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 24.
109 See HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 303.
110 The proposed preference system was composed of four classes, including:
[A] first preference of 50 percent to high qualifications, a second preference of
30 percent plus any unused portion of the first and third classes to parents and
citizens of at least twenty-one years of age, a third preference of 20 percent plus
any unused portion of classes one and two spouses and children of aliens law-
fully admitted for permanent residence, and a fourth class to receive any re-
maining unused portion of a national quota in the allocation of which
preference of not more than 25 percent of the total was to go to brothers,
sisters, sons and daughters of citizens.
Id at 303-304.
I Id. at 304. The bill was also criticized due to its vague requirements for admission.
Id.
112 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
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order to meet the demands of European refugees.1 13
In 1953, Congress' primary objective centered on a renewed at-
tack upon the quota system. In response to President Truman's pres-
sure, a bill was introduced that sought to replace the McCarran-Walter
Act and provide an additional preference that would allow fifteen to
twenty-five percent of all immigrant admissions to be based on refugee
status. 1 14 However, because Congress was still comprised largely of
those members who had been responsible for the overturn of the pres-
idential veto of the McCarran-Walter Act, the bill subsequently was
rejected.' 1 5
C. Refugee Relief Act of 1953
Instead of replacing the McCarran-Walter Act, a compromise was
reached with the passage of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.116 The
Refugee Relief Act was proposed as a temporary measure to allow entry
to special non-quota immigrants in times of international crisis. It was
not, however, intended to establish the United States' guarantee of a
permanent program of refugee admission.11 7 Congressman Walter
emphatically opposed the bill, stating that it undermined the objec-
tives of the McCarran-Walter Act and that a generous refugee admis-
sions policy was detrimental to national security.1 18 On the other
hand, several members of Congress had taken note of the United
States' unique role in the protection of refugees and supported the
bill. 119 Most importantly, President Eisenhower's demand for emer-
gency relief legislation was tied to a warning that the proposed Act
would address important American concerns about the prevention of
the spread of communism.12 0
While refugee status under the Refugee Relief Act was broadly de-
fined,12 1 legislative history reveals that the Act was motivated by for-
113 HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 319. Truman was also responsible for the establish-
ment of the first presidential Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. Id.
114 Id. at 316.
115 Id. at 316-17.
116 Act of August 7, 1953, Pub., L. No. 203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953) [hereinafter the Refugee
Relief Act].
117 See, e.g., The Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 12, n. 12 (asserting that the Refugee
Relief Act was "an emergency relief measure designed to implement certain phases of Ameri-
can Foreign policy[,] ... not... to represent any precedent or commitment on the part of
the Congress or the Government of the United States").
118 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 46.
119 HuTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 319. Emma Lazurus' verses were quoted three times
in the course of the debate. Id. at 319 n.1 1. Some argued that the "United States should do
its share along with the other nations who were accepting refugees." Id. at 318-19.
120 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 45.
121 See Refugee Relief Act, supra note 116, at 400. Under the Refugee Relief Act a refu-
gee was defined to include:
any person in a country or area which is neither Communist nor Communist
dominated, who because of persecution, fear of persecution, natural calamity
or military operations is out of his usual place of abode and unable to return
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eign policy concerns.12 2 Congressional records indicate that the
legislation was passed primarily out of a concern for European stabil-
ity. 123 In 1957, the Refugee Relief Act was amended to conform more
closely to U.S. foreign policy objectives. 124 Section 15(c)(1) of the
amended Act redefined a refugee to include one who departed from
any "Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist occupied
area."
125
IV. The Emergence of Parole Authority
A. The Hungarian Revolution
The Soviet invasion of Hungary played a primary role in shaping
U.S. refugee policy.' 26 In 1956, the Soviet army entered Hungary and
quashed a new, anti-communist government that had been installed
after a popular uprising. 127 Approximately 200,000 Hungarians left
their homeland and fled to Austria and Yugoslavia. 12 8 In response, the
United States rushed in large quantities of relief supplies to the Hun-
garian "freedom fighters."129
President Eisenhower's reaction to the emerging Hungarian refu-
gee situation in Europe reflected the Cold War policies towards refu-
gee admission initiated after World War 11.130 By assisting the
Hungarian refugees, the Eisenhower administration believed that the
United States could express its support for the liberation movement
and thereby undermine Soviet leadership. 31
Hungarian refugees were admitted to the United States pursuant
to the parole authority of the Attorney General. 3 2 Initially, the Ameri-
can public was opposed to the flood of Hungarian immigrants.133 The
government initiated a propaganda campaign to calm public opposi-
tion and enhance the media image of Hungarian "freedom fight-
thereto, who has not been firmly resettled, and who is in urgent need of assist-
ance for the essentials of life.
Id.
122 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 45.
123 See id. In support of the Act, one Congressman stated, "We are now... faced with
problems which have an important impact upon the health and stability of friendly countries
in Europe ... [and which] are creating situations in certain parts of Europe which gravely
endanger the objectives of American foreign policy." Id. (citing Emergency Immigration Pro-
gram Hearings, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1953) (statement of General Walter Bedell Smith,
Acting Secretary of State).
124 Act of September 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957).
125 Id. at 643. The refugee definition also included those fleeing from any Middle East-
ern country. Id.
126 See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 31-32.
127 LOESCHER & SCANAN, supra note 1, at 50.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 54.
130 See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 31-32.
131 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 54.
132 Id. at 55-57.
133 Id. at 56.
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ers." 1 4 Vice-President Nixon was sent on a special mission to Vienna
in order to control "mounting criticism by dramatizing the seriousness
of the problem."13 5 Upon his return, reports were issued in which the
Vice-President stressed the high quality, skills and trustworthiness of
the Hungarian refugees. 136
According to the limitations imposed by the McCarran-Walter Act,
the Hungarian immigration quota had only limited slots available.
13 7
Therefore, on November 26, 1958, President Eisenhower took an un-
precedented step towards the expansion of executive authority in refu-
gee policy, announcing his decision to "parole" thousands of
Hungarian refugees into the United States.1 38
The Eisenhower administration's authority to initiate the Hun-
garian parole program was derived from a 1952 statute that provides in
relevant part:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest
any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole
of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and
when the purpose of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be re-
turned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
13 9
The parole program initiated under Eisenhower has been the sub-
ject of great debate.1 40 In particular, the use of parole authority to
admit large numbers of refugees has been criticized. 141 Legislative his-
tory reveals that parole authority was intended to be limited strictly to
the admission of an individual refugee, and only when obtaining con-
gressional approval was impractical. 142 As Congressman Feighan, a
member of the drafting committee for the statute granting the execu-
tive parole authority, stated, "[i] t was intended to be used as a remedy
134 Id. at 57.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 55. Hungarian quotas had been mortgaged to exceed the numbers allowable
for several years. Id.
138 Id. at 55-56. Parole entry does not bestow the legal benefits of formal admission,
rather, those admitted under parole authority are treated as if they were stopped at the bor-
der. Id. at 55; see, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (hold-
ing as a matter of law that a parolee is an "entrant" alien and therefore is not entitled to
constitutional protection).
139 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952) (amended 1980).
140 See, e.g., Marvin Samuel Gross, Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochina
Refugee, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1975) (analyzing the history and abuse of parole authority
and recommending reform).
141 Id. at 190 (stating that "[t]he continued use of parole authority by the executive
branch to admit large numbers of refugees indicates that the parole statute should be
amended to prevent further abuse").
142 LoESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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for individual hardship cases, no more, no less."143 The admission of
mass numbers of Hungarian refugees was clearly beyond the scope of
the discretionary powers originally granted. 144 Contrary to its previ-
ously expressed intention, in 1960 Congress adopted the Fair Share
Refugee Law,145 that granted the Attorney General the authority to
parole large groups of refugees.'
46
The propriety of the Eisenhower administration's admission of
Hungarian refugees is also questionable in light of the disproportion-
ately large numbers of Hungarian refugees admitted to the United
States in comparison to other host nations.1 47 Furthermore, the vast
majority of Hungarian refugees did not qualify as refugees under the
definition provided by the 1953 Refugee Relief Act. At that time, it was
not certain that the Soviets would remain in Hungary.1 48 Moreover,
only a small number of those who fled Hungary actually were involved
with the Hungarian liberation movement.1 49 While the Hungarians
who stayed faced the brutality of Soviet domination and many were
sent to work camps throughout Russia, few of the thousands who fled
Hungary had a legitimate fear of persecution as required by the re-
quirements of the 1953 Act.' 50
Despite the growing conflict over its expanding use, Congress did
not challenge the executive branch's expansive use of parole author-
ity.151 Actions that had formerly been taken only after Congressional
approval became a regular aspect of the Executive's refugee policy.
Because no standardized procedures were adopted to regulate its use,
refugee admission under the parole power of the Attorney General was
manipulated readily by foreign policy. 15 2 Furthermore, due to the dis-
cretionary nature of parole power, it was outside of the scope of judi-
cial review. After its discovery in 1956, parole authority became a
primary means of concealing the ad hoc nature of refugee
admissions. 153
143 Study of Population and Immigration Problems, House Subcomm. on Immigration and Natu-
ralization of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1964).
144 In total, 38,000 Hungarian refugees were admitted under the parole authority of the
Attorney General. Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 15-16 n.26.
145 Fair Share Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504 (1960). The Fair Share Act
has been criticiied for its discrimination against certain groups. See, e.g., Forty Year Crisis,
supra note 97, at 16.
146 Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 16 n.27.
147 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 51-52. In total, the United States admitted
38,121 Hungarian refugees for resettlement. Id. at 52. Great Britain accepted approximately
21,000, France accepted 13,000, and West Germany accepted 15,000. Id.
148 Id. at 51.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 56.
152 See infra part VA
153 See infra part VA
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B. The Ascendance of Fidel Castro in Cuba
In 1959, Fidel Castro established a communist government in
Cuba.' 54 As a result, between 1959 and 1961, approximately 125,000
Cubans arrived in the United States.' 55 As in the case of the Hun-
garian refugees, the U.S. government's support for Cuban refugee ad-
mission was based largely on Cold War politics.
The Kennedy Administration used parole authority to admit hun-
dreds of thousands of Cuban refugees. 15 6 The United States pursued a
generously passive policy with respect to the processing of Cuban
claims for asylum.1 5 7 As U.S.-Cuban relations worsened, the U.S. con-
sular office disregarded routine criminal checks for those applying for
visas.158 Furthermore, no attempts were made by the Coast Guard to
turn back undocumented Cubans.' 5 9 The admission of refugees
under the parole authority in excess of the quota limits established by
the McCarran-Walter Act became an accepted aspect of U.S. refugee
policy. 160
The U.S. government also provided more financial assistance pro-
grams to help establish Cubans in the United States than it had to any
other group of refugees.1 61 Congress recognized that international
conflicts would continue to create a need for refugee assistance and
that temporary emergency legislation was insufficient. In June 1962,
Congress enacted the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.1 62 This
Act marked Congress' first endeavor to provide ongoing relief to a de-
fined group of refugees. It provided relief for the resettlement of
Cubans as well as international assistance programs to be administered
by the President to meet unexpected refugee developments.' 63
During the 1970s, the effectiveness of U.S. immigration policy as a
means of controlling the spread of Communism was widely ques-
tioned.164 Contrary to Congress' intentions, it became apparent that
the Castro regime actually benefited from U.S. policy by the removal of
154 See, e.g., LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 61.
155 Id.
156 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 68. Almost 250,000 Cubans arrived in
America between 1959 and 1962. See id. at 70. By 1980, approximately 750,000 Cubans had
entered the United States. See ZUCKsER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 106.
157 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 61.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 16 (stating that "by 1961 and 1962 the practice of
wholesale parole of refugees was adopted").
161 See ZUCKER & ZUCKER, supra note 1, at 105.
162 Act of June 28, 1962, Publ. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121 (1962).
163 Id. The Act was also significant in that it provided a nondiscriminatory definition of
refugee. "In omitting any special reference to refugees from communist-dominated areas or
'cold war' responsibilities, the statute also broadened out national perspective on the original
and cause of refugee movements, and implies our willingness to assist all who had fled their
homes." Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 17.
164 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 76-77, 170-71.
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dissidents. Although evidence indicated that the United States' Cuban
refugee policy was largely ineffective, the historic Mariel boat lift
brought almost 130,000 Cubans to the United States in 1980.165 Critics
asserted that government expenditures that had been used to fund air-
lifts and care for Cuban refugees could be better spent on under-fi-
nanced domestic welfare programs.1 66
C. The Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1965: Creation
of a Seventh Preference for Refugees
In 1965, the opposition to the McCarran-Walter Act was finally
successful. The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act marked a dramatic transition in U.S. refugee policy.167 Immigra-
tion opportunities for people of every nation were equalized through
the abolishment of the national origins quota system. 168 The 1965
Amendments gave priority to family members of U.S. residents and
immigrants with needed skills. 169 Most significantly, under a "Seventh
Preference," the 1965 Amendments were the first to recognize that ref-
ugee suffering is an ongoing phenomenon by providing a permanent
statutory basis for the admission of refugees.1 70 Therefore, the 1965
Amendments provided some authority to admit a specified number of
refugees each year. However, a significant barrier to admission was
imposed as only six percent of the total immigration slots were avail-
able for refugees. 71
The most significant aspect of the new legislation was its overt ide-
ological bias. Despite the recent atrocities of the Holocaust in Europe,
Congress gave special status to those fleeing communist-dominated
states.1 72 The 1965 Amendments codified the geopolitical definition
165 Id. at 170. Mariel is a port in Cuba.
166 Id. at 77-78. When it was discovered that the airlifts had brought in "a number of
criminals and other undesirables," popular backlash against Cuban refugees developed
throughout the United States. Id. at 170. Public dissatisfaction also increased because a
greater portion of the Cubans entering were elderly or disabled, and therefore became im-
mediately eligible for Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Id. at 77-78.
167 See 1965 Amendments, supra note 10.
168 The 1965 Amendments state:
No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against
in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place
of birth, or place or residence [with limited exceptions] ... provided, that the
total number of immigrant visas and the total number of conditional entries
made available to natives of any single foreign state... shall not exceed 20,000
in any fiscal year.
Id. at 911-12.
169 Id. at 913.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. The 1965 Amendments require that applicants for asylum show that "(i)
[B] ecause of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they have fled (I)
from any Communist or Communist-dominated country or area, or (II) from any country
within the general area of the Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such
country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion." Id.
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of refugee which had emerged in response to the Cold War by requir-
ing that the applicant depart from a communist or communist-domi-
nated nation. 173 By officially equating the concept of "refugee" with
anti-communist policy, the 1965 Amendments created a permanent
ideological basis for admission.
In the 1965 Amendments, Congress also made clear its intent to
exert its authority over refugee matters. 174 Under existing law, parole
power was limited to "emergent, individual, and isolated situations,
such as the case of an alien who requires immediate medical attention,
and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit of
law."1 75 However, Congress' attempt to bring the admission of refu-
gees within the framework of existing law was largely unsuccessful.
The permanent refugee admission provision was inadequate due to its
inflexibility to refugee crises. 176 Parole authority continued to be used
by the executive branch to supplement existing channels of
admission.177
V. The Impact of the Cold War
A. The Expansion of Parole Authority
Between World War II and 1980, of the 1.4 to 1.5 million refugees
admitted into the United States, less than two thousand were from
non-communist states in Latin America and Africa. s7 8 During the
1970s, the staggering disparity in the number of those admitted from
communist and non-communist nations indicates the tremendous in-
fluence that Cold War ideology exerted on U.S. refugee policy. As the
following table indicates, the domination of foreign policy considera-
tions in refugee matters continued to be facilitated by the extensive
use of parole authority throughout the 1970s:
173 Id. The 1965 Amendments also provided an exemption for victims of natural calami-
ties as designated by the President. Id.
174 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 18.
175 S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1965).
176 See infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text.
177 See infra notes 234-43 and accompanying text.
178 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPE RENCE, supra
note 17, at 2.
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Use of Parole Power, 1968-80179
Non-Communist Total Authorized
Latin America (excluding Cuba) 4,440
(1975-78)
Uganda (1972-73) 1,750
Lebanon (1978) 1,000
Total -,,150
Communist
Cuba (1968-78) 232,666
USSR (1970-77) 17,200
USSR and Eastern Europe (1978-79) 61,924
Czechoslovakia (1970) 6,500
Indochina (1975-79) 290,075
Total 608,365
B. The Duvaliers' Reign: The Haitian Refugee Crisis
Almost thirty years after the American occupation of Haiti, Hai-
tian refugees began entering American ports at a time when Cuban
immigration had reached an unprecedented rate.180 In 1957, the first
significant number of Haitians requested political asylum in the
United States upon the ascendance to power of Francois Duvalier's
military regime.18 1 In 1964, Francois Duvalier had the Haitian consti-
tution amended to grant him a life term in office.18 2 In 1971, he
passed his presidency on to his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier. 183
Under the Duvaliers' rule, dissidents were silenced systemati-
cally. 184 From the time that Jean-Claude Duvalier ascended to power
in 1972 until 1980, there was a continuous influx of Haitians traveling
to America by boat. 185 In contrast to the Cubans who were entering
the United States at roughly the same time, the Haitian refugees en-
countered severe obstacles to admission. 18 6 The United States refused
to relax immigration laws in response to the violent political climate in
179 Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 248 (1984) (hereinafter Unfulfilled Promise) (citing Schmidt,
Development of United States Refugee Policy, INS REPORTER, Fall 1979, at 1-3; World Refugee Crisis:
The International Community's Response, Report to the Committee on theJudiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 213 (1979)).
180 Malissa Lennox, Comment, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United
States' Haitian Immigration Polity, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687, 699-700 (1993). The United States'
occupation of Haiti lasted until 1934. Id. at 695. The United States ruled in a manner similar
to previous Haitian dictators, id. at 696; few citizens had the opportunity to participate in the
political process. Id. at 695 n.69. The U.S. failure to introduce democratic ideals during its
occupation of Haiti is a factor which led to the Haitians' later acceptance of the Duvalier
regime. See id.
181 GIL LOESCHER ANDJOHN SCANLAN, HuMAN RIGHTS, POWER POLITICS, AND THE INTERNA-
TIONAL REFUGEE REGIME: THE CASE OF THE U.S. TREATMENT OF CARIBBEAN BASIN REFUGEES 12
(1985).
182 Lennox, supra note 180, at 697.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 80.
186 Id.
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Haiti. 187 Of the estimated thirty thousand refugees who entered the
United States before 1980, it is estimated that only twenty-five to fifty of
the Haitian applicants were granted asylum.188
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida noted the disturbing difference in the
numbers of Haitians and Cuban applicants granted political asylum.' 8 9
The Civiletti court explained that "[p]rior to the most recent Cuban
exodus, all of the Cubans who sought political asylum... were granted
asylum routinely. None of the over 4,000 Haitians processed during
the INS 'program' at issue in this lawsuit were granted asylum. No
greater disparity can be imagined." 190 The staggering difference in
the numbers of Haitians and Cubans admitted before 1980 dramati-
cally reveals the impact of foreign policy on immigration decisions.19
Despite evidence to the contrary, 192 Haitian refugees seeking asy-
lum in the United States worked against a powerful presumption that
they were not victims of persecution. 193 In Paul v. INS, the Fifth Cir-
cuit denied asylum to nine Haitian applicants.194 Basing its determina-
tion on a single magazine article appearing in The New Yorker
magazine, the Paul court reasoned that "[m]any Haitians seek refuge
in this country, not for political reasons, but for economic ones."195
The Seventh Preference established by the 1965 Amendments, re-
quiring departure from a communist or communist-dominated nation,
added another substantial political bias to immigration policy.196 The
effect of the ideologically-based system was not merely to give an ad-
vantage to Cuban refugees, but also "to make it virtually impossible for
187 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 181, at 12.
[Siteps to relax immigration rules for Cubans, including the practice of waiv-
ing the visa requirement altogether, and the passage of legislation in 1966 to
grant earlier arrivals "permanent resident" status were not taken for the Hai-
tians. Even the most "political" of the Haitians ... were thus denied the certain
asylum granted most Cubans.
Id.
188 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 80. No official statistics are available concern-
ing the number of Haitian refugees admitted between 1950 and 1980. Id. at 80 n.46. The
estimate in the text above is based on newspaper reports and Congressional testimony. Id.
189 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd 614 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980).
190 Id. at 451.
191 See Id.
192 See LOESCUER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 80 n.45. A 1973 Report by Amnesty Inter-
national stated:
Haiti's prisons are still filled with people who have spent many years in deten-
tion without ever being charged or brought to trial. Amnesty International
remains seriously concerned with the continued repression of dissent in Haiti
and the denial of human and legal rights .'... In fact those prisons are death
traps ... [and] find a parallel with the Nazi concentration camps of the past
but have no present-day equivalent.
Id. (quoting Amnesty International Report (1973)).
193 See id. at 82; Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1975).
194 Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d at 196 (5th Cir. 1975).
195 Id. at 199.
196 See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
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any Haitian, on an individual basis, to demonstrate that he or she was
genuinely fearful of persecution." 197
Furthermore, as revealed in Civiletti, internal policies established
by the INS have contributed dramatically to the barriers imposed on
Haitian immigration.1 98 In Civiletti, the court found that procedures
adopted by the INS with respect to Haitian refugees violated their con-
stitutional right to due process.' 99 In 1978, the INS implemented an
accelerated method of processing asylum claims which was applied ex-
clusively to applicants from Haiti.200 Before the "Haitian Program,"
immigration judges heard only between one and ten cases per day.20 1
However, under the accelerated program, Haitian asylum interviews
were conducted at a rate of forty per day. 202 Because of scheduling
conflicts and a shortage of attorneys, Haitians suffered inadequate rep-
resentation.20 3 In addition, although the INS Operating Instructions
required the immediate suspension of a deportation hearing upon the
raising of an asylum claim, directions were given to immigration judges
to proceed with deportation for Haitian applicants. 20 4 In essence, this
practice shifted to the Haitian applicant the burden of proof on the
issue of deportability and foreclosed any opportunity for raising de-
fenses. 205 The Civiletti court remarked that "It]he procedure to which
Haitians were subjected is roughly the equivalent of requiring a crimi-
nal defendant to concede his guilt before providing him any constitu-
tional or statutory rights."20 6
The Civiletti court also noted that INS officials deliberately refused
to give the Haitian refugees notice of the existence of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which reviews com-
ments on applications for asylum. 20 7 The United Nations had
recommended that the United States provide such notice to comply
with its international obligations.208 However, the INS determined
197 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 82.
198 See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442, 511 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
199 Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 511.
200 Id. at 512-13; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("There are literally
millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well
as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law .... Even one whose presence in this country
is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection." (citations
omitted)).
201 Id. at 523.
202 Id. at 524.
203 Only ten to twelve attorneys were handling the Haitian cases at the time of the "Hai-
tian Program." See id. Attorneys reported being scheduled to represent as many as five
claims simultaneously. d.
204 Id. at 520.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 515-16. The substantive provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees are discussed in Part VIA. See infra Part VIA.
208 Civileti, 503 F. Supp. at 515.
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that such notice would produce "delay" in the "processing and in the
expulsion of aliens lacking meritorious claims." 209 In addition, the
Civiletti court found that the INS's practice of imposing on Haitian ap-
plicants a ten day time limit for the filing of asylum and withholding of
deportation claims was arbitrary and discriminatory.210 The court
reasoned:
No single aspect of the Program caused these results. Rather, the vio-
lations were cumulative. The abuses list,-d below were systematic and
pervasive; for the most part they were the direct and logical result of
the orders of the INS Central Office .... As such, each abuse is
colored with the intent to expel Haitians. Taken as a whole, the Hai-
tian Program, and all of the abuses listed below, carried out that
intent.2
11
In addition to exposing the INS's responsibility for Haitian mis-
treatment, the court in Civiletti disputed the presumption that Haitian
applicants are merely "economic refugees."21 2 The Civiletti court ex-
amined the pattern of human rights abuses in Haiti, particularly those
abuses concerning Haitians repatriated by the U.S. government.21 3
The court indicated that "It]he pattern of harassment and abuse ...
had been found by every group which has investigated the treatment of
the returnees, with the notable exception of the State Department."2 1 4
Moreover, the Civiletti decision reveals that persecution may also
take the form of economic deprivation. 215 The court stated that the
weakening of the Haitian economy could be considered another as-
pect of political persecution in Haiti.2 16 The policy of instilling fear in
the people of Haiti led to the initial exodus of Haitian professionals,
resulting in insufficient education and public services. 21 7 By 1960,
eighty percent of Haitian professionals resided in the United States,
Canada, or Africa.218 Those responsible for managing Haiti's mone-
tary system lacked a system of accounting, resulting in insecurity and
209 Id. at 515-516. The effect of the refusal to provide applicants with knowledge of the
UNHCR was to grant sole discretion to the State Department regarding the selection of cases
deserving of review. Id. at 516.
210 Id. at 521-522. Normally, applicants were given between ten and thirty days to make
the required filings. Id. A failure to meet these deadlines would mean that an order for
deportation was automatically entered. Id. at 520.
211 Id. at 519.
212 Id. at 476-86.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 481. One returnee described Fort Dimanche Prison, where he was sent upon
his forced return to Haiti. He stated, "[t]he cells kept between 22 and 33 prisoners. These
prisoners are detained in the nude, with no medical help .... At the prisons, a great per-
centage of the prisoners died either of tuberculosis or the consequence of torture or wounds
inflicted during their time there." Id. at 493.
215 Id. at 507.
216 Id. at 507-508.
217 Id. at 509. "While many of these persons may have left because they had supported
other candidates, . . . it is also true that Duvalier saw Haiti's elite as his enemy." Id. at 508.
218 Id.
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corruption.2 19 As the Civiletti court explained, "[m]uch of Haiti's pov-
erty is a result of Duvalier's effort to maintain power. Indeed it could
be said that Duvalier had made his country weak so that he could be
strong."220
C. The Flight from Saigon: The Indochinese Refugee Crisis
The United States' response to the refugee crisis created in Viet-
nam following the fall of Saigon was far more generous than its Haitian
counterpart. 22 1 By 1975, defeat was certain for the non-communist In-
dochinese nations. 22 2 Following the collapse of the Nguyen Van Thieu
regime, the U.S. government became dedicated to a program to rescue
its Vietnamese allies.2 2 3 To facilitate their expedient evacuation, the
Vietnamese refugee crisis was characterized as a rescue operation.2 24
Almost 130,000 Vietnamese refugees were airlifted out of Saigon prior
to the communist takeover in April, 1975.225
The U.S. government's response to the refugee crisis in Vietnam
reveals yet another dimension of the impact of political bias on refugee
policy decision-making. 226 The impetus for government intervention
in Indochina, in contrast to Hungarian and Cuban refugee policy, was
not primarily Cold War politics. Instead, the United States' attempt to
provide assistance to the Vietnamese refugee population stemmed
from political sympathy to the former Vietnamese allies who had
fought with the United States in support of the Nguyen Van Thieu
regime.2 2 7 Many Americans felt a sense of obligation to a people that
the United States had supported and then abandoned. 228
In 1975, reports indicated that the majority of Americans were op-
posed to the admission of Vietnamese refugees. 22 9 The Vietnamese
refugees were perceived as potential competitors for jobs and federal
aid programs. 2 30 President Ford attempted to assuage public opposi-
tion and overcome restrictionist sentiment.23 1 Upon signing the exec-
utive order creating the Committee on Refugees from Southeast Asia,
219 Id. at 509.
220 Id. For a discussion of the interrelation between economic and political factors in
determining refugee status, see Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 68 (asserting that "[t]he
motivation of the applicant and the conditions in his country of origin may involve interre-
lated economic and political factors").
221 Id.
222 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 102.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 110-11.
225 Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 30.
226 See VALERIE O'CONNOR SUTrER, THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE DILEMMA 219 (1990).
227 See Id. at 220.
228 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 104.
229 Id. at 114.
230 Id. at 114-15.
231 Remarks of the President upon Signing Executive Order 11860 establishing the Com-
mittee on Refugees from Southeast Asia, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 531 (May 19, 1975).
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the President stated that "[t] hey are people of talent, they are industri-
ous, they are individuals who want freedom and I believe they will
make a contribution now and in the future to a better America."
232
Within months after the initial evacuation, thousands of Indochinese
immigrants reached American shores.2 33
The first official request for parole by an Indochinese immigrant
was made in 1976.234 The Indochinese parole program initiated
under the Ford Administration is the most dramatic illustration of the
inadequacy of then-existing legislation. 23 5 With each successive group
of refugees and subsequent exercise of parole power, Congress be-
came more skeptical about the expanding Indochinese refugee parole
program. 236 Senator Kennedy asserted that "the Executive was put in
the position of waiting repeatedly until the number of refugees in the
countries of first asylum reached crisis proportions and then declaring
an emergency which required yet another special program. '"237 Con-
gress expressed concern over what appeared to be the limitless
number of refugees to whom the United States owed an obligation. 238
At Congress' request, the Ford administration issued a morato-
rium in which it agreed to request no further paroles of Indochinese
refugees. 239 However, in 1977, President Carter initiated yet another
parole program involving the admission of 15,000 Indochinese refu-
gees.240 Congress saw this use of parole power as a classic abuse of
executive authority and the ad hoc administration of refugee policy.
2 41
On March 30, 1978, President Carter authorized a plan designed to
provide for the development of new refugee legislation. 242 As a tem-
porary measure until the adoption of the new laws, President Carter
approved the use of parole power to admit 25,000 refugees per year.
2 43
In 1978, it became apparent that the exodus out of Vietnam was
not a result of the voluntary escape of those suffering persecution.
244
232 Id.
233 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 121.
234 Id. at 124.
235 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 31 n.99. The author explains, "The insufficiency
of the seventh preference numbers could no longer be viewed as a sporadic occurrence, but
the parole authority was regularly being used as a 'supplementary' provision." Id.
236 Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Refugees from Indochina, 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 507 (1976).
237 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 30.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 31.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 32. In 1978 and 1979, "intensive consultations occurred between the executive
branch and congressional committee staff aimed at drafting a consensus refugee bill." Id. at
43.
242 Bernard Gwertzman, New Policy Approved to Admit Indochinese - 25,000 Are Expected to
Enter the U.S. in Year under Interim Rules, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 1978, at Al.
243 Id.
244 See SUTITER, supra note 226, at 64-65. Reports indicate that thousands of Chinese
minorities were forced to leave by the new government. Id.
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The generous refugee policies implemented under the Carter adminis-
tration were being exploited by a well-organized and profitable refugee
trade.245 Those who profited from these operations were not limited
only to members of the overseas Chinese community, who ran the ref-
ugee trade, but also Vietnamese officials who arranged for the illegal
departures. 2 46
I. The Refugee Act of 1980
A. Legislative History
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (the 1951 Convention) provided a foundation for the sub-
stantive provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980.247 Under the 1951 Con-
vention, an individual applying for political asylum has a less stringent
burden of showing refugee status than an applicant under the previous
U.S. standard. 248 Instead of establishing a "clear probability" of perse-
cution, under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention an applicant need only
show that he or she has a "well-founded fear" of persecution. 249 Article
33 of the 1951 Convention also established the principle of "non-
refoulement."250 By this provision, the United Nations sought to im-
pose an affirmative duty on signatories to not repatriate any individual
who faced probable persecution in their homeland. 25 1
By 1950, however, the United States had become skeptical of
pledging unlimited support to refugees.2 52 Congress revealed its indif-
ference to humanitarian efforts towards refugee protection through its
failure to become a party to the 1951 Convention.253 Yet in 1967, the
United States responded to international pressure and agreed to be-
come a party to a subsequent international agreement, the United Na-
245 Id.
246 Id. at 66-67. The refugee trade was so successful that it "soon replaced the coal indus-
try as Vietnam's primary source of foreign exchange." Id. at 67.
247 See 1951 Convention, supra note 13.
248 Id. at 152.
249 Id. at 154. The standard under former U.S. law required a showing of "clear
probability" of persecution to show a valid claim for asylum. See, e.g., Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d
536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967); Cisernas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1976).
250 See 1951 Convention, supra note 13. The non-refoulement principle is the principle
of no forced return. The French verb "refouler" means "to return." See OxFoRD HACHE-rE
FRENCH DICrIONARY 690 (1994).
251 See 1951 Convention, supra note 13. The 1951 Convention provides that a Con-
tracting state must not:
[E]xpel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsover to the fron-
tiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or polit-
ical opinion.
Id. at 176.
252 See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 1, at 41.
253 Id. Mrs. Roosevelt was selected as the United States representative in the United
Nations. She emphasized the limits of American generosity and warned against an "increas-
ing tendency to drive the United Nations into the field of international relief and to use its
organ as the source and center of expanding appeals for funds." Id.
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tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol). 254
The United States thereby became bound by all of the substantive pro-
visions of the 1951 Convention. 255
According to the Protocol, the United States was required to apply
the definition of refugee pursuant to Article 1 of the 1951 Conven-
tion. 256 However, the guidelines established by the Protocol were not
implemented by the United States following its adoption.2 57 Govern-
ment officials contended that the adoption of the Protocol did not
affect U.S. immigration law.258 Furthermore, judicial interpretation
crippled any impact that the new standards contained in the Protocol
might have had. In Kashani v. INS, an Iranian national argued that he
need not show a clear probability of persecution to gain refugee status
under the Protocol.2 5 9 Instead, he argued that the court was required
to consider his "state of mind."260 Rejecting this standard, the Seventh
Circuit determined that a "well-founded fear" of persecution as re-
quired by the Protocol can only be satisfied by objective evidence. 26 1
The Kashani court held that, in practice, the standard contained in the
Protocol and the "clear probability" standard "converge."
262
Decisions following the adoption of the Protocol indicate that
there was no uniform standard for the determination of refugee status.
Instead, the law was applied inconsistently, producing varying re-
sults. 2 63 Furthermore, on appeal, courts generally deferred to the dis-
cretion of the INS's administrative authority.
2 64
In 1970, the "Kurdika Affair" had the effect of committing mem-
254 The United States ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REc. 29,607
(1968).
255 The Protocol incorporated the refugee definition provided in Article 1 of the 1951
Convention. Protocol, supra note 71, at 268. In addition, signatories became bound to Arti-
cles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention. Id.
256 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as one who:
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
nationality and being outside of the country of his former habitual residence, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
See 1951 Convention, supra note 13, at 152.
257 See infra notes 259-265
258 See Anthony Asuncion, Note, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca: Establishment of a More Liberal
Asylum Standard, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 915, 922 n.49 (1988) (noting that U.S. officials believed
that the United States was already in compliance with the Protocol).
259 Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1977).
260 See id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 See, e.g., Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969) (requiring "probability of
persecution"); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1970) (requiring "likely"
persecution).
264 See, e.g., Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (1977).
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bers of Congress to the establishment of refugee legislation.2 65 This
incident involved a Lithuanian sailor who left a Soviet fishing vessel
and sought asylum in the United States.2 66 Although the sailor cited
an instance of previous persecution, he was immediately returned to
his ship without further inquiry by Coast Guard Officials, who were
unaware of the proper procedure.2 67
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress worked to establish a compre-
hensive scheme of refugee law which was free of ideological and geo-
graphical bias.2 68 Congressman Peter Rodino, an advocate of reform,
acknowledged the inadequacies of existing refugee law. He stated:
Since World War II, the Congress had enacted several major statutes
authorizing the admission of refugees, but is was not until the 1965
amendment that a refugee provision became part of the permanent
law. Although this provision was laudable, it was obvious that this pro-
vision was inadequate .... The position of the United States as a
world leader demands that we, with other countries of the free world,
be in a position to offer asylum to the oppressed. We must be able to
take quick, effective, and affirmative action to permit the orderly entry
into the United States of a fair share of refugees seeking freedom. We
must uphold America's tradition as an asylum for the oppressed.
269
Senator Kennedy and Congressman Feighan introduced a bill that
sought to incorporate expressly the definition of refugee as provided
in the Protocol.2 70 Senator Kennedy asserted:
A comprehensive asylum policy for refugees is long overdue .... I
would strongly suggest a definition similar to that contained in the
convention relating to the status of refugees of the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees. Its inclusion in the basic immigration
statute is a logical extension of the accession by the United States, to
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in
1968.271
Congressmen complained that the discussions between Congress
and President Carter concerning the 1977 parole program were infor-
mal, that refugee admission procedures were disorganized, and that
there were no concrete standards for selection.2 72 Subcommittee mem-
bers also complained that they were not informed of the facts of the
most recent Indochinese parole program before its initiation. 273 Presi-
dent Carter's decision to disregard President Ford's moratorium and
265 For a more detailed discussion of the Kurdika Affair and its impact on the initiation
of reforms in U.S. refugee legislation, see Asuncion, supra note 258, at 924 n.58.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97 at 20-43 (discussing proposed reforms in refugee
legislation leading up to the adoption of the Refugee Act).
269 Proposed Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act: Hearings on HR. 9112, HR
15092 and HR. 17370 Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on theJudiciay, 91st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 57 (1970).
270 Id. at 87.
271 Id.
272 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 31-32.
273 Id. at 32.
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continue the Indochinese parole program heightened congressional
concern over parole power.274 In an attempt to bring the admission of
refugees within the parameters of legislative authority, proposed re-
forms aimed to establish a system of admission with adequate numeri-
cal flexibility so that Congress would have the ability to respond to
international refugee crises.2 75 By 1980, the stage was set for the com-
prehensive regulation of refugee admissions.
B. The Adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980
On March 17, 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980.276
During congressional debates, Congress acknowledged its intent to
conform to the standards of the 1951 Convention and the Protocol.2 77
Congressman Rodino, in voicing his support for the legislation, de-
scribed the Refugee Act as:
[O]ne of the most important pieces of humanitarian legislation ever
enacted by a United States Congress .... By [its] deep dedication and
untiring efforts, the United States has once again ... demonstrated its
concern for the homeless, the defenseless, and the persecuted peoples
who fall victim to tyrannical and oppressive governmental regimes.
278
The Refugee Act attempted to add flexibility to the preference
system established by the 1965 Amendments and to reduce the need
for parole authority. 279 Under the Refugee Act, refugees are admitted
through either annual resettlement quotas or emergency proce-
dures.280 The Refugee Act provides that the "normal flow" of refugee
admissions should be allotted among "refugees of special humanita-
rian concern." 281 For the first three years of the Refugee Act's imple-
274 See supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
275 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 27-28. In addition to their intention to create a
flexible program, Congress sought to "avoid the creation of mass refugee parole programs
without prior congressional consultation." Id. at 28.
276 See Refugee Act, supra note 12.
277 126 CONG. REc. 3,757 (1980). "The new definition makes our law conform to the
United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." Id.; see also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
278 126 CONG. Rac. 1519, 1522 (1980). Congresswoman Chisholm expressed her hope
that the Refugee Act "not be tainted with ideological, geographical or racial or ethnic biases."
Id. at 1523.
279 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (1994).
280 Id.
281 Id. The Act provides in relevant part:
The number of refugees who may be admitted under this section in any fiscal
year after fiscal year 1982 shall be such number as the president determines,
before the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation, is
justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in that national interest.
Id.
In the original Senate bill the phrase did not contain the word "humanitarian," but
instead indicated resettlement for those refugees of "special concern." See Forty Year Crisis,
supra note 97, at 62. The addition of "humanitarian" in the Refugee Act emphasizes Con-
gress's intention that the "normal flow" refugee program be used for humanitarian purposes.
Id.
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mentation, the number of refugees admissible was set at 50,000.282
Subsequently, the "normal flow" of refugees has been subject to execu-
tive determination, after consultation with Congress.
283
The strict numerical limitation of the "normal flow" plan is com-
plimented by a flexible emergency admissions procedure. 284 However,
Congress limited the use of parole power to individual aliens in emer-
gency situations where "compelling reasons in the public interest with
respect to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled into
the United States rather than be admitted as a refugee." 285 Congress
attempted to assure itself a substantial role in all decisions reflecting
refugee admission through Section 207(e) of the Act.28 6 That section
requires that Congress, "to the extent possible," receive detailed infor-
mation concerning the nature of the refugee situation and the
number and allocation of the refugees to be admitted.
28 7
Signficantly, the Refugee Act was the first piece of legislation to
establish a procedure for the application for asylum by a person physi-
cally present within the United States, or by one who presents herself
at a U.S. border.23 8 The Refugee Act also broadened the grounds for
withholding deportation to include persecution based on social group
or nationality.2 89
C. The Implementation of the Refugee Act
Since the adoption of the Refugee Act, Congress' intent to estab-
lish a geographically and ideologically neutral system of refugee admis-
sions has been undermined.2 90 As early as April 15, 1980, a report
issued by the Carter Administration indicated a substantial likelihood
of geopolitical bias in the administration of the Act.2 91 During the first
half of 1980, of the 114,284 refugees admitted, only 120 were from
282 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (1994).
283 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1994).
284 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). Under the Refugee Act, parole power may still be exer-
cised by the Attorney General. Section 1158(a) asserts:
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his dis-
cretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he
may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole
of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.
L
285 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (1994).
286 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1994); see also 126 CONG. REc. 3,757 (1980). Congress sought to
"write into the new law the clear legislative intent of both Houses that parole authority...
should no longer be used to admit mass numbers of refugees-since the new provisions of this
Act should provide ample flexibility and authority in dealing with foreseen or unforeseen
refugee situations." Id.
287 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1994).
288 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994).
289 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994).
290 See infra notes 298-364 and accompanying text.
291 See Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 69-70. These statistics do not include Cuban
refugees. Id."
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Africa and 64 from Latin America. 292 Throughout the 1980s, statistics
clearly reveal that while the average approval rate was approximately
twenty-five percent, the percentage approval rate for those refugees
who fled communist-dominated countries was between fifty and eighty
percent.2 9
3
The dramatic differences between the numbers of approved refu-
gees departing from politically "unfriendly" regimes and those
originating from policy-neutral countries reveals the continuing influ-
ence of foreign policy on refugee policy decision-making. 294 The table
below illustrates the impact of political bias on refugee admission:295
Country Admitted (1983-86) Admitted (1987)
Ethiopia 29.3% 47.3%
Lebanon 2.4% 26.4%
Poland 34.0% 47.4%
Romania 51.0% 59.7%
Haiti 1.8% 0.0%
Afghanistan 37.7% 26.2%
Iran 60.4% 67.4%
Nicaragua 14.0% 83.9%
El Salvador 2.6% 3.6%
Guatemala 0.9% 3.8%
Three fundamental aspects of current refugee policy are largely
responsible for the continuing ideological bias following the enact-
ment of the Refugee Act: (1) the lack of guidelines regarding the
proper definition of refugee, resulting in inconsistent and restrictive
requirements for the standard of proof required in order to establish
refugee status;2 96 (2) major flaws in the Department ofJustice's imple-
mentation of the Refugee Act;29 7 and, (3) judicial disregard for the
legislative intent of Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act prohibiting the
return of refugees to places of persecution. 298
(1) Restrictive Application of the Standard of Proof Requirements
Under the Refugee Act, a refugee must establish a "well-founded
fear" of persecution.2 99 The failure of the Refugee Act to establish an
292 Id.
293 See THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECIDE OF EXPERIENCE,
supra note 17, at 2.
294 See Davalene Cooper, Note, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? Political asylum
in the United States, 76 Ky. L. J. 923, 941-42 (1988) [hereinafter Promised Land).
295 Id.
296 See infra notes 300-326 and accompanying text.
297 See infra notes 327-36 and accompanying text.
298 See infra notes 337-64 and accompanying text.
299 Under the Refugee Act, a refugee is defined as:
[A] ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution because of
race, religion, nationality, memberships in a particular social group, or political
19951
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ideologically neutral standard of refugee eligibility stems largely from
the vague guidelines contained in the Refugee Act concerning the ap-
propriate evidentiary standard of proof for showing a "well-founded
fear." 300 The lack of uniform procedures for adjudicating asylum
claims has left district directors and immigration judges without gui-
dance as to how they should exercise their discretion.3 01 In the ab-
sence of administrative guidance, the Refugee Act allows an alarming
degree of judicial discretion in the determination of the substantive
standards required for refugee eligibility.30 2
An examination of recent decisions reveals the courts' struggle to
interpret essential provisions of the Refugee Act. 30 3 In INS v. Stevic,
the Supreme Court distinguished between two separate burdens of
proof for the withholding of deportation and the establishment of a
claim for asylum.304 In Stevic, a Yugoslavian citizen appealed an order
of deportation. 30 5 He argued that provisions regarding refugee status
under the Refugee Act and the Protocol are determinative in the con-
text of deportation as well as asylum and, therefore, that the relatively
generous standard of a "well-founded fear" of persecution must be ap-
plied to his case.306 However, the Supreme Court determined that the
legislative history of the Refugee Act indicates that Congress intended
it to apply only to claims for asylum. 307 The Court stated, "it]he pri-
mary substantive change Congress intended to make under the Refu-
gee Act, and indeed in our view the only substantive change even
relevant to this case, was to eliminate the piecemeal approach to the
admission of refugees."308
According to the rule of Stevic, aliens residing within the United
States are required to show a clear probability of persecution to estab-
lish a claim for the withholding of deportation. Those claiming asy-
opinion, or (b) in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate
consultation... may specify.
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (1994); see also Forty Year Crisis, supra note 97, at 66-69 (arguing that
the essential determination of refugee status under the Refugee Act hinges on an assessment
of individual and subjective factors).
300 See THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE,
supra note 17, at 44.
301 Id.
302 Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals has also provided little guidance. Id. Be-
cause almost all of their published decisions uphold denials, adjudicators are only shown
"numerous instances of when asylum should not be granted, and only scarce instances of
when a grant of asylum is warranted." Id. at 45 (emphasis in original). Under this system, an
appellate judge has almost no authority on which to rely to reverse a finding. Id.
303 See generaly Cynthia A. Isaacs, Note, The Torch Dims: The Ambiguity of Asylum and the
"Well-founded Fear of Persecution" Standard in Sadeghi v. U.S., 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
721, 742 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court must "provide some illumination to the
asylum standards" to enable the United States to live up to its international obligations).
304 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
305 Id. at 410.
306 Id. at 413.
307 Id. at 421-25.
308 Id. at 425 (emphasis in original).
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lum, however, need only show a "well-founded fear" of persecution.
Despite its explanation of these two distinct standards, however, the
Supreme Court in Stevic failed to define the more lenient standard of a
"well-founded fear" of persecution.3 0 9
The difficulty of meeting the clear probability test for withholding
deportation is illustrated by a case involving an Iranian applicant, adju-
dicated by a district director of the INS.3 10 The director recalled:
The claimant said his father was murdered. He had a newspaper arti-
cle showing a picture of someone he said was his father and two other
men in Iran being lynched. But I don't know if it's his father. He's
also got an affidavit from a friend who was present describing the ex-
ecutions. But the friend could be lying.311
Another director admitted, "[i]f we used [the clear probability test] all
the time, no one would be given asylum."3 12
Despite the rule of Stevic, courts continued to apply the clear
probability standard to asylum claims. One year after the Supreme
Court handed down its opinion in Stevic, the Board of Immigration
Appeals in In re Acosta held that the standard contained in the Protocol
and the clear probability standard are "identical."3 13 Similarly, in Sotto
v. INS, the Third Circuit determined that because in Stevic the
Supreme Court "refused to decide the meaning of the phrase 'well-
founded fear' of persecution," the former asylum standard of clear
probability remains in effect.31 4
While a majority of courts agree that the well-founded fear test is
more lenient than the clear probability test, the proper evidentiary
burden required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution has
not been established 3 15 In 1984, the Seventh Circuit in Carvajal-
Munoz v. INS distinguished between the standard for withholding de-
portation and the standard for granting asylum.31 6 To establish a
claim for asylum, the Carvajal-Munoz court required a showing of previ-
ous persecution.3 1 7 The court emphasized that this evidentiary stan-
dard may be met through the respondent's testimony if that testimony
includes specific facts.31 8
In Bolanos-Hernadez v. INS, the Ninth Circuit also found that the
well-founded fear test governing asylum claims is a more lenient stan-
309 Id. at 430.
310 Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 179, at 253.
311 Id. (citing Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Adjudications: An Evolv-
ing Concept and Responsibility for the Immigration and Naturalization Service 54 (June &
December 1982)).
312 Id.
313 In reAcosta, Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA 1985).
314 Sotto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836 (3d Cir. 1984).
315 See infra notes 316-26 and accompanying text.
316 Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984).
317 Id.
318 Id.
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dard.3 19 However, the court determined that mere assertions of "possi-
ble fear" are insufficient to satisfy the requirements for asylum.3 20 The
court stated that foreign nationals applying for asylum would qualify
only if they could establish "the existence of a valid reason for fear."32 1
Two years later, in Diaz-Excobar v. INS, the Ninth Circuit applied an
even more demanding standard for the granting of asylum by requir-
ing "credible, direct, and specific evidence" of a reasonable fear of
persecution.3 22
Recent decisions regarding El Salvadoran applicants indicate the
tractability of the well-founded fear test to serve foreign policy objec-
tives.3 23 In one Board of Immigration Appeals controversy, an appli-
cant from El Salvador claiming asylum based on his forced
conscription into the military had to establish not only that a violation
of international human rights standards had occurred, but also that
the military's action represented the "government policy" of the El Sal-
vadoran government.32 4 Under this decision, applicants for asylum
have the additional burden of showing "evidence of condemnation of
military action by international governmental bodies, not merely by
nongovernmental organizations."3 25 Since recent State Department
reports have indicated that El Salvador has "shown progress in the area
of human rights," 3 26 the Board of Immigration Appeals' restriction of
El Salvadoran refugee status is consistent with American foreign policy
objectives.
(2) Practice Under the Refugee Act
Another significant reason for the failure of the Refugee Act is
Congress' failure to provide the Department of Justice with the neces-
sary resources to ensure that asylum judges and immigration directors
are provided with sufficient training and information. 327 Further-
more, INS regulations require district directors and judges to obtain
an opinion letter from the State Department's Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs before making a determination. 328
319 767 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1984). Bolanos, a citizen of El Salvador, had testified
that he had been a member of a right-wing party in El Salvador for two years. He was
threatened when he refused to join the guerrillas. Five of his friends were killed after their
refusal to join. Id.
320 Id. at 1283 n.ll.
321 Id. at 1283.
322 792 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986).
323 See THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE,
supra note 17, at 41.
324 Id. at 41 (citing In reA-G, Interim Dec. No. 3040 BIA 1987)).
325 Id.
326 Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 179, at 254 n.61.
327 See The Refugee Panic Act of 1993, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A26 (asserting that the
crisis in U.S. immigration matters is caused by mismanagement and inadequate resources).
328 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE, supra
note 17, at 29. Most countries, including Canada, France, and Germany, have offices respon-
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This requirement enables the State Department to inject a strong ele-
ment of foreign policy into the immigration process through advisory
opinions. 32 9 These advisory opinions continue to play a large role in
shaping refugee policy and often serve as opinions on the ultimate
question of whether a refugee has a legitimate claim of persecution. 33 0
Therefore, asylum decisions remain largely the prerogative of the State
Department acting under the authority of the INS. 3 31
A striking example of the influence of advisory opinions is the
treatment of El Salvadoran claims. 33 2 A confidential INS report states:
[Clertain nationalities appear to benefit from presumptive status,
while others do not. For example, for an El Salvadoran national to
receive a favorable advisory opinion, he or she must have a "classic
textbook case." On the other hand [the State Department] sometimes
recommends favorable action where the applicant cannot meet the
individual well-founded fear of persecution test. This happened in
December 1981 a week after martial law was declared in Poland.
Seven Polish crewman jumped ship and applied for asylum in Alaska.
Even before seeing the asylum applications, a State Department offi-
cial said "We're going to approve them." All of the applications, in
view of INS senior officials, were extremely weak. In one instance, the
crewman said the reason he feared returning to Poland was that he
had once attended a Solidarity rally (he was one of more than 100,000
participants at the rally). The crewman had never been a member of
Solidarity, never participated in any political activity, etc. His claim
was approved within 48 hours.
333
In addition to the extensive influence of the State Department in
refugee processing, the sheer volume of claims that must be heard and
the judge recruitment process have contributed to the inadequacy of
the refugee admissions process. In recent years, due to the accelerated
deportation policy many judges adjudicated over fifty-five asylum
claims in one day.3 3 4 In order to ensure the processing of these in-
creased numbers of claims, asylum interviews were shortened from an
hour to only fifteen minutes. 3 3 5 Furthermore, a majority of the judges
sible for determining refugee status that are separate from their foreign ministries. Id. at 2
n.4.
329 Id. at 2. The opinions are often prepared through the State Department officer in
each country. Due to the fact that the officer is closely involved with the "conduct of diplo-
macy" of a particular country, his or her recommendations are largely influenced by foreign
policy concerns unrelated to refugee status. Id. at 23.
330 Id. at 11. The State Department advisory reports often conflict with other reports
offering information relating to human rights abuses. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civi-
letti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 482 (S.D. Fla.), affid 614 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1980). With respect to the
Haitian refugees, the court stated, "The State Department Report stands out in stark contrast
with all other evidence presented .... It is the only evidence suggesting that [Haitians
returning to Haiti] are not mistreated .... Id.
331 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE AcT OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE, supra
note 17, at 11.
332 See Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 179, at 254.
333 Id.
334 Lennox, supra note 180, at 700.
335 Id. Through the accelerated program, "the INS had effectively denied Haitian de-
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are recruited directly from within the INS, which fosters a restrictive
treatment of refugee claims. 33 6
(3) Interpretation of the Non-Refoulement Provision
The U.S. government's forced repatriation of thousands of Hai-
tians over the past decade dramatically reveals the failure to establish
an ideologically and politically impartial body of refugee law. The Hai-
tian Migrant Interdiction Program originated in 1981 in response to a
steady influx of Haitian refugees into the United States as a result of
the oppressive Duvalier Regime.3 37 The Reagan administration en-
tered into a bilateral agreement with Jean-Claude Duvalier which al-
lowed U.S. officials to board Haitian vessels on the high seas outside of
territorial waters and question individuals on board regarding their im-
migration status.3 38 In order to ensure the protection of refugees, the
INS was instructed to screen each individual before they were returned
to determine if a credible fear of persecution existed.339 The Haitian
government assured the United States that repatriated Haitians would
not be punished for their departure. 340 In return, Haitian aid was in-
creased by $11.5 million.3 4 1 Thereafter, President Reagan issued a
proclamation whereby he directed the Coast Guard to intercept Hai-
tian vessels and return passengers to Haiti. 342 The Haitian Migration
Interdiction Program initiated under President Reagan was the first
U.S. attempt to control immigration to the United States through
Coast Guard blockades. 343 Both domestic and international human
rights supporters vigorously criticized the use of such extraordinary
measures to prevent refugees from reaching U.S. shores.344
tainees their right to petition for political asylum by rendering the detainees' hearings mean-
ingless and ineffective." Id.
336 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFUGEE ACr OF 1980: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE, supra
note 17, at 2-3.
337 Agreement to Stop Clandestine Migration of Haitians to the United States, Sept. 23,
1981, U.S.-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10, 241, at 3559 [hereinafter U.S.-Haiti Agreement].
338 Id.
339 Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking Political
Asylum in the United States, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 877 (1994) [hereinafter Closed Borders].
However, despite procedures to determine refugee eligibility, between 1981 and 1990, of the
22,940 Haitians intercepted in international waters, only eleven were found to be eligible to
apply for asylum. Refugees, Racism, and Reparations, supra note 180, at 704.
Wo U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 337, at 3560. As indicated by the testimony of
those returned to Haiti, this promise was not kept. See Diego Ribadeneira, Two Forced Back to
Haiti Live in Persecution, Fear, BosTON GLOBE, June 23, 1993 at 1 (describing the experiences
of two repatriates who were branded Aristide Supporters and suffered severe torture); see also
supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
341 Refugees, Racism, and Reparations, supra note 180, at 703.
342 High Sea Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Proclamation No. 4865, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1981),
reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 at 1259 (1988).
343 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 877.
344 Id. at 877. Amnesty International has described the Haitian Interdiction Program as
an egregious violation of international law that not only places Haitians at risk of human
rights violations upon return, but also directly undermines the international regime for the
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While the economic condition in Haiti is troubling, poverty alone
cannot explain the dramatic increase of Haitians applying for asylum
in the United States since Aristide's overthrow.345 Given the violent
coup of Aristide in 1991, Haitians applying asylum warrant serious con-
sideration. However, the United States continues to maintain that
those fleeing Haiti are primarily "economic refugees" rather than the
victims of political persecution. 346 In May 1992, President Bush ex-
panded the Haitian Interdiction Program through the Kennebunkport
Order.347 The order gave the Attorney General unreviewable discre-
tion in determining whether a refugee should be repatriated. 348 The
most objectional aspect of the order, however, was its failure to provide
procedures to identify those with a credible fear of persecution. 349
The Coast Guard was instructed to return Haitians without a hearing
or counsel.3 50 As a presidential candidate, Clinton was a staunch critic
of the treatment of Haitian refugees. 35' However, despite his promises
to suspend the program, the interception of Haitian vessels continued
under the Clinton administration. 352
In recent years, the forced repatriation of Haitian refugees has
been challenged on the basis of the non-refoulment provision set forth
in the 1951 Convention and incorporated in the Refugee Act.35 3 In
the landmark decision, Sale v. Haitian Centers Counse the Supreme
Court held that the non-refoulment provision applies "only in the con-
text of domestic procedures within U.S. territory."354 Finding that the
protection of refugees." Id. (citing Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 3, Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992)).
345 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 881. The author states, "Haitians' determination to
flee their homeland despite the risk to their lives indicates something far greater than mere
economic motivation. Such determination demonstrates a fear of persecution in Haiti. And
such determination by so many suggests that, in the eyes of refugees, life in Haiti was too
dangerous to be tolerated." Id.
346 Refugees, Racism, and Reparations, supra note 180, at 705.
347 President Bush advanced three reasons for forcibly returning the Haitian refugees.
Id. at 704-07. He asserted that Haitian refugees are "economic" and not political refugees.
Id. Second, he suggested that the interdiction program was implemented "out of a concern
for their safety and a desire to discourage them from attempting the perilous ocean journey
to the United States." Id. at 706. Finally, Bush stated that those returned to Haiti generally
did not suffer persecution and therefore could be safely repatriated. Id. at 706-07.
348 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 877.
349 The order directed that it was not to be construed "to require any procedures to
determine whether a personis a refugee." Id.
350 Id.
351 Clinton referred to the Bush administration's policy towards the Haitians as a "cruel
policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without an asylum hearing."
Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: The Two Clintons, N.Y. TIMEs, February 22, 1993, at Al.
352 Id. President Clinton explained his change in position, stating "[t]here is a differ-
ence between political and economic refugees." Id.
353 See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (1lth Cir. 1991); Sale v.
Haitian Centers Counsel, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993). When the United States became a party to
the Protocal, it also became bound to the nonrefoulment provision of Article 33 of the 1951
Convention. Refugee Act, supra note 12.
354 113 S.Ct. at 2560.
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non-refoulment provision of the Refugee Act did not have extraterrito-
rial application, the Court reasoned that "return" is analogous to "de-
port" and therefore, the provision only applies to exlusion and
deportation proceedings. 3 55 The majority in Sale did, however, ac-
knowledge that gathering fleeing refugees and returning them to the
country they desperately sought to escape "may even violate the spirit
of Article 33 .... ,356
In his powerful dissent Justice Blackmun recalled:
The Convention that the Refugee Act embodies was enacted largely in
response to the experience of Jewish refugees in Europe during the
period of World War II. The tragic consequences of the world's indif-
ference at that time are well known . . .The refugees attempting to
escape from Haiti do not claim a right of admission to this country.
They do not even argue that the Government has no right to intercept
their boats. They demand only that the United States, land of refu-
gees and guardian of freedom, cease forcibly driving them back to de-
tention, abuse and death.
3 5 7
In May 1994, after considerable international and domestic pres-
sure, the Clinton administration ordered an end to the Haitian Migra-
tion Interdiction Program.358 However, the U.S. reaction to the recent
exodus of Cubans, indicates that the interdiction policy remains a via-
ble response to international refugee crises.3 5 9 In 1994, Cuban vessels
were stopped and sent to detention centers in the United States and a
U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.3 60 An estimated 30,000
Cubans were intercepted during August and May of 1994.361 Cuban
nationals arriving in the United States received the same treatment as
other refugee applicants and were required to demonstrate "a well-
founded fear" of persecution. 362 The Clinton administration's re-
sponse to the Cuban refugee crisis received sharp criticism, particularly
from the Cuban-American community.36 3 In September 1994, the
Clinton administration agreed to guarantee the admission of a mini-
mum of 20,000 Cubans annually. 36 4
355 Id. at 2560.
356 Id. at 2565.
357 Id. at 2577.
358 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 881. Randall Robinson, Executive Director of Trans-
Africa, was instrumental in effecting the change in the Clinton Administration's position with
respect to Haiti. Susan Page, Lobbyist's Fast Over Haiti Stirs Black Caucus, ST. Louis-DISPATCH,
May 6, 1994, at 5B. Robinson began a hunger strike on April 12, 1994, which lasted 23 days,
in protest of the continued interdiction program. Id. He explained, "To do less makes the
United States and our President complicit in the killing of Haitians as they are thrown back
into the killing fields of their country." Id.
359 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 884.
360 Id. at 885.
361 Id. at 884.
362 Id. at 886; see also supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
363 Closed Borders, supra note 339, at 885 n.154. Protesters objected to Clinton's policy of
detaining Cuban refugees and called for an invasion of Cuba. Id.
364 Id. at 886. Unlike the Haitians, the Cuban refugees benefited from a large and active
Cuban-American community that assured their preferential treatment by the United States.
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VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
A review of decisions since the adoption of the Refugee Act indi-
cates a continuing debate over the proper role of foreign policy in
refugee determinations. While Congress' efforts in enacting the Refu-
gee Act are laudable, they were perhaps misguided and unrealistic.
Given the critical nature of asylum adjudications, remedial measures
are urgently needed:
(1) Congress should provide sufficient funding and resources for ade-
quate training and a channel of recruitment for judges who have had
no previous experience within the INS. This will ensure that immigra-
tion judges will not be predisposed to reject legitimate applicants and
also have the ability to recognize false claims.
(2) Legislative history reveals that the evidentiary burden should be
lower than the clear probability standard and that generally oppressive
conditions and the applicant's subjective state of mind must be given
greater weight. Until the ambiguities inherent in the current asylum
standards are clarified, case-by-case interpretations that ultimately de-
fer to political policy concerns will continue. The Department of Jus-
tice must be required to promulgate fact-specific standard guidelines
for judges to interpret the appropriate test of a "well-founded fear" of
persecution. In order to effect its intent, Congress must also amend
the Refugee Act as necessary to provide further clarification and
guidance.
(3) Judges should be required to be well advised of the underlying
legislative intent regarding each provision of the Refugee Act. Fur-
thermore, Congress should also take steps to ensure that the judiciary
is interpreting the Refugee Act in accord with legislative purpose.
(4) Judges should not be required to request and rely on advisory
opinions from the State Department. Instead, information and statis-
tics regarding country conditions must be made available through an
independent and unbiased source. If an advisory opinion is requested,
judges should be cautioned against regarding the opinion as conclu-
sive evidence in support of or against an applicant's claim. Instead,
judges must be trained to weigh the merits of each individual case
when making their determination of a well-founded fear of
persecution.
(5) A greater degree of discretion should be granted on appeal of asy-
lum claims. BIA judges must take affirmative steps to ensure that the
interpretation of the Refugee Act is in line with Congressional intent.
(6) Finally, the interception and forced repatriation of those poten-
tially fleeing persecution must end. The humanitarian spirit of the
Protocal and the Refugee Act reflects a goal of protecting human life.
As one commentator stated, "We know of no other agreement between the U.S. and another
country that guarantees that a minimum number of nationals of that country will be admit-
ted to the U.S." Id. at 887 n.157 (citing 71 Interpreter Releases 1213 (1994)).
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To realize this goal, the Supreme Court and Congress must extend the
application of the non-refoulment provision to international seas.
An overview of immigration law in the United States reveals an
emerging pattern of political and ethnic bias that is inconsistent with
democratic ideals. Allowing foreign policy discretion in asylum deci-
sion-making not only encourages arbitrary results and violates the
spirit of neutrality as set forth in the Protocal, but also has severe con-
sequences for those who would otherwise gain admittance to the
United States. In promulgating the Refugee Act, Congress attempted
to establish a comprehensive scheme for the admission of refugees
based on the individual merits of each case. In doing so, Congress
recognized the proper role of the United States in alleviating the
plight of victims of persecution. It is clear, however, that the Refugee
Act is only a first step towards achieving a system of refugee admission
that is free of ideological bias. The U.S. government must be re-
minded that America's strength lies in its cultural diversity and respect
for human rights. Congress and the Supreme Court must continue to
work to ensure that the role of foreign policy in refugee determina-
tions is eliminated.
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